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Abstract 
Interstate water dispute stands at the juncture of two fields of law: federalism under constitutional law, and 
water law. Because India is a federal democracy, and because rivers cross state boundaries, constructing 
efficient and equitable mechanisms for allocating river flows has long been an imperative legal and 
constitutional subject. The provisions of the Constitution relating to interstate water dispute give a good 
instance of co-operative federalism.  In India water is primarily falls under State list, except in case of 
interstate rivers where the Central government can intervene. However, powers of the river board created 
under River Boards Act, 1956 only have advisory powers. There have been instances where States have 
refused to accept the decision of tribunals rendering the arbitration not binding, which makes the Indian 
water dispute settlement mechanisms further ambiguous and opaque. The paper examines the methods and 
policies used before independence to tackle the problem of interstate river water dispute. The paper 
highlights a need for quick movement to arbitration or adjudication in case of a conflict. The paper presents 
some recommendations, including the setting up of an independent federated institution to adjudicate and 
negotiate between the parties to the dispute within a fixed time period. 
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Introduction 
Water is a major resource for sustaining life on earth. Water contributes to welfare in several ways: 
health, agriculture, industry, etc. This extraordinary demand for water in d iverse  fields has resulted in its 
scarcity.  Moreover, availability of water is highly uneven in both space and time as it is dependent upon 
varying seasons of rainfall and capacity of storage.  
India is served by two great river systems, i . e ., t h e  Grea t  H i m a l a ya n  Dr a i na ge  s ys t e m  and the 
Peninsular River network.  It has 14 major rivers that are inter-state rivers and 44 medium rivers of 
which 9 are inter-State rivers. For the reason that India is a federal democratic system, and because rivers 
cross state boundaries, constructing proficient and equitable mechanisms for allocating river flows has 
long been a significant legal and constitutional question. Many inter-state river-water disputes have 
erupted since independence. 
On the face of it, inter-state water disputes involve issues of: 
(i) Allocation of waters between different states; 
(ii) Apportionment of construction costs and benefits if a project is developed jointly by more than 
one state; 
(iii) Compensation to the states prejudicially affected by the implementation of a project by another 
state; 
(iv) Dispute settlement relating to interpretation of agreements and;  
(v) Excess withdrawals by a state. 
 
 
Constitutional History, Relevant Provisions and Other Legislations 
Until the Government of India Act of 1919, all irrigation works except those not exceeding Rs 10 lakhs in 
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cost were under the control of the Central Government, and subject to the sanction of the Secretary of 
State. The GOI Act 1919, made irrigation a provincial subject, while matters of inter-provincial concern or 
affecting the relations of a province with any other territory were subject to legislation by the central 
legislature. The GOI Act of 1935 drew attention explicitly to river disputes between one province and 
another or between a province in British India and a federated Indian state. The provincial legislative list 
included “water, that is to say water supplies, irrigation a n d  c an a l s , d r a i n a ge  a nd  
e m b a n k m e n t s , w a t e r  s t o r a g e  a n d  w a t e r  power.” 
Sections 130 to 134 of the Government of India Act, 1935  laid down that a province or a princely state 
could complain to the Governor General if its interests were prejudicially affected in the water supplies 
from a natural source, due to the action of another province or princely state.  If  the Governor General 
was of the opinion that the issues involved were of ample importance, he was required to appoint  a  
commission  to  investigate  the  matter  and  to  report   to  him.  After considering the 
report he was to give a decision he deemed proper. 
In the draft constitution the original provisions on the subject, viz., Articles 239 to 242 were drafted on the 
same lines as sections 130 to 134 of the G o v e r n m e n t  o f  I n d i a  Act,  1935. However, a subsequent 
amendment replaced these provisions and Article 262 was added. 
The relevant provisions in the present Indian Constitution are: 
• Entry 17 in the State List, 
• Entry 56 in the Union List, and 
• Article 262. 
Entry 17 makes water a state subject, but qualified by Entry 56 in the Union List, which empowers Union 
regarding the regulation and development of inter-state rivers and river valleys to the extent to which such 
control of the Union is declared by parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest. In addition to 
this, Article 262 explicitly grants right to legislate to parliament over the matters in Entry 56, and also 
gives it primacy over the Supreme Court. Various River Authorities have been proposed, but not 
legislated or established as bodies vested with powers of management. Instead, river boards with only 
advisory powers have been created.
 
Article 262 states: 
(1) Parliament may by law provide for the adjudication of any dispute or complaint with respect to the 
use, distribution or control of the waters of, or in, any inter-state river or river valley. 
(2) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, Parliament may by law provide that neither the Supreme 
Court nor any other court shall exercise jurisdiction in respect of any such dispute or complaint as is 
referred to in clause (1). 
 
Parliament has enacted two laws under the above provisions: 
1)  River Boards Act of 1956- This Act was made for setting up of river boards by the central 
government at the request of the interested parties. 
2)  Inter-State Water Disputes Act of 1956 – Under this Act, in case of a dispute, the affected State is 
empowered to request the Central government to refer disputes relating to the use, distribution, or control 
of Inter-State river waters for adjudication by tribunal constituted under the Act.  In addi t ion  to  th is ,  if 
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the Central Government feels that the water dispute referred to it cannot be settled by negotiations, then it can 
refer the dispute for adjudication by a tribunal constituted under the Act. The tribunal  shall then  
investigate  the  complaint  and  forward  a  report  to  the  Central  government known as  
order or award of the tribunal. Within three months of the report, the Central G overnment or any of the 
S tate G overnment concerned can approach the tribunal fo r  c l a r i f i ca t ion .  The Cen t ral    
Government sh a l l  pu bl i sh  t he  t ribunal ’s  decision in the official gazette, and then the decision will be 
final and binding on the parties to the dispute. Neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall 
exercise jurisdiction in respect of any water dispute referred to a tribunal. 
Besides this, National Water Policy of 1987 also dealt with distribution of water amongst the states. Water  
being  a  State  subject,  it  is  necessary  that  the  initiative  and responsibility for 
development of inter-state rivers and river valleys should primarily rest on the State government. 
Experience, has, however, shown that the river valley projects have been considerably hampered in the 
past by the conflict of interests among different state governments. While it is necessary to ensure that 
the powers of  State  governments  in  relation  to  inter-state  rivers  and  river  valleys  
remain unaffected, it is also necessary to make suitable provision for resolving conflict among  the 
State governments and for achieving maximum results in respect of conservation,  control  and  
optimum  utilization  of  water  resources  of  inter-state rivers. 
India’s Experience 
The negotiation through agreements has been one of the paramount ways to solve inter-state river water 
disputes in India. Over 130 agreements have been evolved on the sharing of Inter-State river waters or on 
specific projects. Since most of the river basins  of  India  are  Inter-State  in  character,  the  
Central  Organizations  viz.,  the Planning  Commission  and  the  Ministry  of  Water  
Resources  with  its  technical attached organization, the Central Water Commission, have exercised a 
very well set schedule  of  techno-economic  clearance  guidelines  in  approving  the  
Inter-State projects planned by the  States  for implementation under the five year plans. This procedure 
has been institutionalized, even though it is time consuming. There is a loophole in this, since the 
clearance is required only if the State wants Central Plan funding for the project. Otherwise, the State can 
go ahead with the project if funds are not a constraint. In that case, the aggrieved States can seek judicial 
intervention to stop the project. 
 
THE KRISHNA RIVER WATER DISPUTE 
The Krishna River begins in the Western Ghats, a mountain range that runs north-south along the western 
coast of India. The river drain parts of three States: Maharashtra (where the river begins); Karnataka (the 
middle riparian) and Andhra Pradesh (the furthest downstream). The first irrigation projects in the basin 
were built in 1855, when India was part of the British Empire. As the basin population grew, the States 
signed water allocation agreements with each other, first in 1892 and again in 1933, 1944 and 1946. In 
1951; three of the States signed a new water allocation agreement. But the fourth State, Mysore, refused 
to ratify the agreement, and the interstate disputes lingered. The 1953 statute creating a new State of 
Andhra Pradesh and the States Reorganization Act, 1956 changed important boundaries in the Krishna 
River basin and consolidated a number of States. But disagreements over water continued. Then, in 1969, 
in answer to a petition from three States, the Central Government invoked the Inter-State Water Disputes 
Act and created the Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal. Four years later, the Krishna Tribunal issued its 
award. Additional requests from the States for clarification forced the Tribunal to reexamine certain 
assumptions and decisions. As a result, it was not until 1976 that the Tribunal published its final award, 
which contained the following conclusions: 
 
The Tribunal evaluated two alternative solutions, which it called “Scheme A” and “Scheme B.”   
• Scheme  A  was  based  on  an  apportionment  based  on  the  annual availability of 
2,060 TMC (thousand million cubic feet) of water in the basin. The Tribunal  allocated  this  
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water  to  the  States  of  Andhra  Pradesh,  Karnataka  and Maharashtra. The Tribunal 
allocated the surplus to the State of Andhra Pradesh but it did not acquire a permanent (vested) right to 
those waters. 
• Scheme B, contemplated the creation of a Krishna Valley Authority, a basin-wide government entity, 
to allocate water and manage the river, including surplus flows. The State of Andhra Pradesh did not 
endorse this alternative while Maharashtra and Karnataka did. Because the three States did not 
collectively agree to create a Krishna Valley Authority, the Tribunal did not adopt Scheme B. The 
Tribunal allowed the States to re-open the water allocations after May 3, 2000. 
The subsequent round of adjudication began in 2004 with the formation of a second Krishna River 
Tribunal. The Krishna II Tribunal increased the amount of annual allocable water to 2,578 TMC. But the 
Tribunal made those additional allocations less dependable than the base allocations in 1976. 
Like its precursor, the Tribunal did not explain what happens when there is not adequate water in the river 
to satisfy demands in drought. The Tribunal called for the creation of a Krishna Water Decision 
Implementation Board to administer its findings. The Tribunal said the States could re-open the Tribunal’s 
order after May 31, 2050. In the meantime, two of the States, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, have filed 
petitions in the Supreme Court, challenging the award which is pending before the Supreme Court. 
 
 
THE SARKARIA COMMISSION 
The Sarkaria Commission in its report at Chapter XVII on Inter-State River Water Disputes has 
recommended that:- 
• Once an application under Section 3 of the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act is received  
from  a  State,  it  should  be  mandatory  on  the  Union  Government  to constitute 
a Tribunal within a period not exceeding one year from the date of receipt of the application of any 
disputant State. The Inter- State River Water Disputes Act may be suitably amended for this purpose. 
• The Inter-State Water Disputes Act should be amended to empower the Union Government to 
appoint a Tribunal, suo-moto, if necessary, when it is satisfied that such a dispute exists in fact. 
• There should be a Data Bank and information system at the national level and adequate machinery 
should be set up for this purpose at the earliest. 
• The Inter-State Water Disputes Act should be amended to ensure that the award of a Tribunal 
becomes effective within five years from the date of constitution of a Tribunal. If, however, for 
some reasons, a Tribunal feels that the five years period has to be extended, the Union Government 
may on a reference made by the Tribunal extend its term. 
• The Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956 should be amended so that a Tribunal's award has  the  
same force and  sanction  behind  it  as  an  order or decree of the Supreme Court to make a 
Tribunal's award really binding. 
These five recommendations were considered   by the erstwhile Sub- Committee of the Inter-State 
Council. The Sub-Committee accepted four out of five recommendations. The time frame specified for 
constituting a Tribunal by the Union Govt. was increased from one year to two years. The Inter-State 
Council Secretariat prepared a consensus paper on the recommendations of Sarkaria Commission, which 
was deliberated upon during fifth meeting of the Standing Committee of Inter-State council under the 
chairmanship of the Union Minister of Home Affairs. 
The Standing Committee recommended that "the Tribunal should give its award within a period of three 
years from the date of its constitution. However, if for unavoidable reasons the award could not be given 
within a period of three years, the Union Government may extend the period suitably not exceeding two 
years. The award should be implemented within two years from the date of notification of the award. If 
for unavoidable reasons the award  could  not  be  implemented  within  a  period  of  two  
years  the  Union Government may extend the period suitably.” 
Based on the recommendations given by the Inter-State Council on Sarkaria Commission’s 
Recommendation a bill for amending the Inter State Water Disputes Act 1956 was introduced in Lok 
Sabha on 7.3.2001. The Bill was passed in Lok Sabha on 3.8.2001 and Rajya Sabha on 11.3.2002 and 
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received the assent of the President on 28.3.2002. 
 
POSITION IN U.S.A. 
Although, the U.S. Constitution makes no mention of water but the text, which went into effect in 1789, 
expressly grants powers to Congress to regulate interstate commerce. In 1800s, U.S. Supreme Court held 
that interstate commerce included shipping and navigation. In more recent times, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has held that water sold  across  state  lines  implicates  the  interstate  commerce  clause;  
States  may therefore not impose unreasonable bans or restrictions on the movement of interstate water. 
In the United States, the federal government plays a dominant role in the construction  and  operation  
of  dams,  locks,  canals  and  other  infrastructure  on interstate  rivers.  The two l ead  
f e de r a l  agenc ies  a re  the  U.S. Army Corps  o f  Engineers and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. 
Because of the extensive investment in dams, locks and irrigation canals, virtually all intrastate rivers in 
the United States have been “federalized”. The issue of who gets what from the rivers remains a State 
issue. The States are the ones who issue permits for water diversions, and their procedures differ 
significantly between States. The distribution of water to retail consumers is typically the responsibility of 
local governments, counties, cities and towns that have their own water utilities. 
 
INTERLINKING OF RIVERS IN INDIA: REALITY OR MYTH 
The Indian Rivers Inter-link is a large-scale civil engineering project that aims to join the majority of 
India's rivers by canals and so reduce persistent water shortages in parts of India.  In  December  
2002,  the  Supreme  Court  ordered  to  take  up  the  task  of interlinking major rivers of 
the country. The National Water Development Agency has, after carrying out detailed studies, identified 
30 links for the preparation of feasibility reports  u nd er  th e  Nat ion a l  P er sp e c t i ve  P la n , 1980 .  
It has p r e p a r e d  feasibility reports of 6 such links. 
Criticism: Critics of the Inter-link scheme have alleged that the environmental impact of these projects 
would be extreme. Diverting water from so many rivers would have a serious impact on the mangroves 
of the coastal regions and hence on fish stocks, that extra irrigation will cause salt levels to rise and that 
the project will take precious, and disputed, water from Bangladesh causing India international problems.  
Critics also point to the enormous costs conservatively estimated at some $115bn USD which India can ill 
afford. It has also been suggested that the program is a vast vote-buying exercise on the part of sections of 
the Indian political establishment. A  Bench comprising Chief Justice S H Kapadia and Justices K S 
Radhakrishnan and Swatanter Kumar has asked Central Government, “Whether the project is feasible, if 
so how and when will it be possible at what cost.” In  more  recent  news,  hearing  the  same  
petition  Supreme  Court  has questioned  whether the interlinking of rivers would require land 
acquisition; the Supreme Court said it might not favor the project if it meant a huge financial burden on the 
government. The fate of this ambitious project proposing linkages between major rivers by the year 2016 
has virtually remained a non-starter and the detailed project report is virtually in cold storage. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, current Indian water-dispute settlement mechanisms are ambiguous and opaque. In the light 
of the above discussion, it is ample clear that Centre has failed to provide an effective way to deal with 
the problem of inter-state river water disputes. Delayed agreement over water has prompted ineffective, 
non- cooperative investments in dams, irrigation, and agriculture and industry more generally. In 
India not only the process of agreement is slow, but, effectively, binding arbitration does not exist. The 
threat point of no agreement has been the outcome in several major disputes (e.g., Cauvery; Ravi- Beas). 
This can result in inefficient levels of investment by the individual, non-agreeing states, generating a 
diversion of scarce investment resources, as well as inefficient use of the water itself. This in turn can 
have negative impacts on economic growth. The problems are compounded by the entanglement of 
inter-state water disputes with more general Center-State conflicts. These impacts can be reduced by a 
more efficient design of mechanisms for negotiating inter-state water disputes.  An independent 
federated body should be set up to adjudicate and negotiate between the parties to the dispute within a 
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fixed time period.
 
Interlinking of rivers might lead to land acquisition, problems relating to culture and 
ecosystem, creating conflicts between states, as in Cauvery, and between state a n d  t h e  p e o p l e , a s    
in t h e  c a s e  o f  N a r m a d a .  Destruction o f  c u l t u r e s , communities, and ecosystems, creating 
conflicts between states, as in Cauvery, and between state and people, as in Narmada is quite evident as 
in Sardar Sarovar project. Conflicts are dealt more politically than scientifically.  Interstate disputes 
could take decades to resolve. The canals, designed for carrying irrigation waters rather than large peak 
flows, will not be sufficient to control or divert floods in the northern states but will transfer silt. Several 
large dams built to provide the head and storage  required  to  supply  the  canals  will  
permanently  submerge  fertile  lands, forests, village communities and  towns, leaving millions of 
people displaced or dispossessed. Therefore, Supreme Court is right in questioning centre as to the 
feasibility and consequences of the project. In nature what is linked are not rivers but water itself, through 
the hydrological cycle.
 
A balanced water cycle demands a holistic policy that promotes forest cover, 
prevents erosion, enhances ground water through micro-watershed structures, and provides for desolation 
and maintenance of existing tanks, lakes and reservoirs. A vigilant judiciary should punish corrupt 
administrations for non-implementation of environmental regulations, right to life and livelihood.
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